

**FROM AFGHAN JIHAD TO TALIBAN ALLIANCE: THE
EVOLUTION AND DECLINE OF TEHREEK-E-NIFAZ-E-
SHARIAT-E-MUHAMMADI**
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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the rise of the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) as a regional movement advocating for Islamic law in Pakistan's Malakand Division, its evolution into a significant participant in the Afghan conflict, and its eventual decline. Founded in 1989, TNSM initially focused on implementing Sharia through political and militant means, drawing inspiration from Afghanistan's jihad against Soviet forces. Its leaders, particularly Sufi Muhammad, sought to replicate the success of the Afghan Mujahideen in Pakistan. Following the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, TNSM shifted its focus to support the Taliban's resistance against US and NATO forces. The organization mobilized extensive local support, raising funds and recruiting thousands of fighters dispatched to Afghanistan. Despite these efforts, TNSM's involvement in the conflict resulted in significant losses of its members and diminishing support in the Malakand Division. The movement's influence waned further after the death of Sufi Muhammad in 2019, leading to its formal decline. This paper comprehensively analyzes TNSM's rise and fall, its impact on regional dynamics, and its role in the post-9/11 Afghan conflict.

Keywords: TNSM, Malakand Division, Taliban, Islamic Movements, Post-9/11 Afghanistan

Introduction:

This paper attempts to trace the origin, rise, and eventual collapse of Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi(TNSM)in Pakistan's Malakand Division. The formation of TNSM was influenced by the political developments in Afghanistan during the 1980s, particularly the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the subsequent rise of the Mujahideen. Inspired by the Mujahideen's success and the Taliban's seizure of power, Sufi Muhammad, a veteran of the Afghan Jihad, rejected electoral politics and initiated a movement to impose Islamic Sharia in Malakand. He forged connections with the Taliban and supported their Sharia implementation in Afghanistan (Wei, 2016).

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The post-9/11 reality, marked by the US-led NATO invasion of Afghanistan, significantly impacted TNSM. Sufi Muhammad, under TNSM's banner, led thousands of tribesmen from Dir into Afghanistan to support the Taliban against US and NATO forces. However, the lack of training and poor equipment among these combatants resulted in heavy casualties, primarily due to US airstrikes and fighting against the Northern Alliance (Khan N. I., 2010). These losses led to widespread disillusionment and a dramatic decline in public support for TNSM in Malakand Division. The group's influence further diminished following the military operation in 2009 and the death of its leader, Sufi Muhammad, in 2019, marking the end of TNSM's presence in the region (Dawn, 2019).

The Constitutional Status of Dir Following 1969 Merger with Pakistan

During British rule, the Malakand Division, comprising the princely states of Dir, Swat, and Chitral, maintained independent administrative systems. After joining Pakistan in 1947, these states retained internal autonomy while the central government managed defense, communication, and foreign affairs (Sultan-i-Rome, 2012). On August 15, 1969, the "Dir, Chitral, and Swat (Administration) Regulation, 1969" abolished these princely states, and in 1970, the "Province of West Pakistan (Dissolution) Order" integrated the region into the provincial government of NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). The 1972 Provisional Constitution designated the area as a Provincially Administered Tribal Area (PATA), with Articles 260 and 261 outlining the extension of laws and executive authority in the region. These provisions were retained as Articles 246 and 247 in the 1973 Constitution, which also renamed the area as a Federally Administered Tribal Area (Iqbal, 2010).

The 1975 regulations in Malakand Division created parallel judicial systems, with newly established Tribunals possessing limited authority. Amendments in 1976 converted these Tribunals into Jirgas, transferring judicial powers to the Executive, but the Jirgas remained largely ineffective (Sultan-i-Rome, 2012). A 1978 amendment further restricted the Jirgas' jurisdiction, shifting most cases to the judiciary, which led to confusion and delays. Frustrated by the inefficiencies of this system, locals began demanding regular laws, creating an opportunity for Islamic fundamentalist parties and religious leaders to gain influence by promising reforms (Darr, 2009).

Formation of TNSM

In response to growing public unrest in Malakand Division, the Provincial government established a commission in 1981, led by Justice Allah Bakhsh, to gather opinions on extending regular laws to the area. The commission's 1982 report recommended replacing PATA Regulations with standard laws, but government delays further alienated the public. Dissatisfaction with the judicial system grew, leading to intensified efforts by local bar associations and political leaders to demand legal reforms. However, during negotiations, some local leaders, particularly from Dir, rejected these demands, advocating instead for the implementation of Islamic Sharia (Chawla N. K., 2019).

A pivotal meeting in Lal Qilla, Dir, in 1989, led to the formation of TNSM, with Sufi Muhammad, a member of Jamaat-i-Islami, as its leader (Afridi, 2018)

. TNSM adopted the slogan "*Shariat ya Shahadat*" (Sharia or Martyrdom) and mobilized support across the region, capitalizing on public frustration with the existing legal system. The movement gained momentum, especially after the Peshawar High Court's 1990 ruling against PATA Regulations, which created a legal vacuum and exacerbated local grievances. TNSM's call for Sharia resonated widely, leading to its rapid expansion in Dir and neighboring areas such as Swat, Buner, Shangla, Bajaur, and Chitral (Ayaz, 2003).

Ideological Foundations and Objectives of TNSM

TNSM was founded on the ideology that Islam is a comprehensive way of life, governing not just religious practices but all aspects of society, including politics, economics, and law. Sufi Muhammad, the leader of TNSM, argued that the implementation of Islamic Sharia was essential for establishing a just society, as it provided a complete code for human life. He criticized the existing legal systems, both PATA and regular laws, and saw them as inadequate for addressing the needs of Muslims, emphasizing that only strict adherence to Islamic principles could bring about true reform (DOPEL, 2013).

TNSM's objectives were focused on the Islamization of the judicial system in Malakand Division. The movement sought to replace existing laws with Sharia-based judicial practices, aiming to create Islamic courts led by Qazis and to free the judiciary from executive influence (Women, 2014). Unlike other Islamist movements, TNSM concentrated on reforming the judiciary rather than engaging in electoral politics, believing that a Sharia-compliant judicial system would naturally lead to the establishment of an Islamic society (Afridi, 2016).

However, the movement's vision was criticized for its narrow focus on judiciary reform and for attempting to implement a version of Islamic governance similar to that of the Afghan Taliban, which included restrictive social policies (Women, 2014). This approach was seen as incompatible with Pakistan's parliamentary democracy and raised concerns about the broader implications for the rest of the country (Wei, 2016).

TNSM's Strategy and Expansion

TNSM devised a three-pronged strategy to establish an Islamic society in Malakand Division. The first component was unity (Itfaq), aimed at uniting supporters under a common platform. The second was a boycott (Bara't) of state institutions deemed un-Islamic until they were reformed. The third was Jihad, interpreted as a continuous struggle, whether physical or financial, to achieve their goals (Toru, 2005). Though TNSM initially claimed to pursue its objectives through peaceful means, their slogan, "*Shariat ya Shahadat*" (Sharia or Martyrdom), hinted at potential violence. As the movement gained popularity, its leaders openly threatened to use force if their demands were not met (Afridi, 2018).

TNSM's outreach began with a selective campaign targeting influential local figures, followed by a mass contact campaign that spread its message through mosques and public gatherings. Their efforts culminated in the establishment of Qazi Courts, starting at Lal Qilla, Maidan, where cases were adjudicated according to Sharia. Despite lacking legal status, these courts gained significant popularity due to their swift and affordable justice, leading to the movement's expansion across Malakand Division (Ayaz, 2003).

The movement's success in Dir inspired TNSM to broaden its activities, particularly as public opinion remained divided on whether to extend regular laws, amend PATA regulations, or implement Sharia. The dissolution of the PPP government in 1990 further fueled TNSM's influence as they continued to advocate for the implementation of Sharia in the region (Sekine, 1992).

Impact of Political Strategy and Legal Developments on TNSM

The TNSM opposed electoral politics and urged local leaders to boycott elections, a stance initially supported by local political figures and the public. However, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and other parties opted to participate in the 1990 elections, undermining TNSM's efforts to consolidate support for Sharia. Despite TNSM's continued boycott, which affected electoral turnout, JI's participation led to its defeat in a traditionally secure seat (Iqbal, 2010).

In February 1994, the Supreme Court of Pakistan declared the PATA Regulations unconstitutional, prompting TNSM to intensify its mobilization. They urged a boycott of legal institutions and labeled non-supporters as Kafir, effectively increasing their public support (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2005). In response to government inaction, TNSM organized a large-scale blockade of major roads in Malakand Division in May 1994, drawing substantial public participation (Ali I., 2009). The movement's non-violent image eroded as tensions escalated into violence, particularly after security forces clashed with TNSM supporters in Buner (Khan N. I., 2010). An agreement with the provincial government was reached for Sharia implementation, but the lack of follow-through led TNSM to resume protests and public agitation (Ahmad I., 1994). This culminated in further violent confrontations and public statements by TNSM's leadership hinting at a potential armed struggle against the government, intensifying the conflict and increasing support for their actions among the public (Sultan-i-Rome, 2009).

The Start of Insurgency in Swat and Bajaur

In response to the TNSM's escalating demands, the provincial government proposed a Shariat Package to be announced on November 3, 1994, with a proclamation planned in Buner during a by-election on November 6, 1994. However, TNSM viewed this as a deceptive tactic to gain support for the ruling party's candidate (Worldwide, 2013). Concurrently, the Peshawar High Court ordered the establishment of a camp court in Matta, Swat, on November 2, 1994, which TNSM leaders from Swat—Muzaffar Saeed, Fazlullah, and Maulana Khalid—used as a pretext to incite violence (Sultan-i-Rome, 2012). They mobilized a large crowd to

prevent the court's setup, resulting in the hostage-taking of judges, lawyers, and court staff. The TNSM militants then seized key locations in Swat, including Saidu Sharif Airport and police posts, and killed a Member of the Provincial Assembly (Ahmad I., 1994). The ensuing conflict with security forces, who were eventually able to restore order, led to the deaths of 40 people, including 12 security personnel (Chawla N. K., 2019).

Operation in Bajaur

Similarly, in October 1994, TNSM militants in Bajaur revolted against the provincial government's decision to bring Bajaur Agency under the administrative control of DC Peshawar, interpreting it as an attempt to undermine their demand for Sharia (Iqbal, 2010). Given Bajaur's strategic importance and proximity to Afghanistan, TNSM militants were well-armed and capable of receiving external support. Security forces launched a major operation targeting TNSM strongholds in Bajaur, including areas like Loisam, Salarzai, and Nawagai. The operation involved heavy artillery and resulted in the demolition of TNSM members' homes (Ayaz, 2003).

During this period, TNSM's leader, Maulana Sufi Muhammad, though expressing concern, did not evade responsibility for the uprising. A ceasefire agreement was eventually brokered on November 6, 1994, by Maj Gen. Fazal Ghafoor. Despite the temporary peace, the TNSM resumed its activities, holding public meetings and advocating for Sharia until their focus shifted towards jihad in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks (Haider, 2014).

Foreign Involvement in the Malakand Insurgency

The prolonged conflict in Afghanistan significantly impacted neighboring regions, including the Malakand Division, where the insurgency could be seen as an indirect consequence. Many leaders of the TNSM, including Sufi Muhammad and his close associates, had unsuccessfully participated in electoral politics in Pakistan. Frustrated with their failures, they turned to religious extremism as an alternative path to power. These leaders, mostly Imams with experience in the Afghan Jihad, were skilled in mobilizing support for extremist causes, exploiting the local population's discontent and the region's abundance of weapons from the Afghan conflict (Ahmad, 1994).

There were also indications of foreign involvement, particularly from the Afghan Taliban. During the military operations in Swat, unfamiliar fighters and advanced weaponry among TNSM militants suggested external support. Interior Minister Nasirullah Babur accused Afghanistan of direct involvement in the insurgency. Reports also noted the presence of Persian-speaking fighters, likely from Afghanistan's Tajik community, and suspected links to then-Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, who had established significant influence in Malakand during the Afghan Jihad. The cooperation between local tribes and Afghan militants further fueled the insurgency, complicating efforts to restore peace in the region (Iqbal, 2010).

Emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Their Relationship with TNSM

The Geneva Accord, signed in 1988, marked the Soviet Union's exit from

Afghanistan, which was completed by 1989. At the time of the Soviet withdrawal, Dr. Muhammad Najibullah (r. 1988–1992) was the President of Afghanistan. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 left Najibullah without critical support and foreign aid, leading to his ouster by various Mujahideen factions. The Peshawar Accord of 1992 established an interim government under Burhanuddin Rabbani and his party, Jamiat-e Islami (JI). However, the new government's authority was limited to a small portion of Afghanistan, as large parts of the country remained under the control of armed groups. The lack of central authority and continued foreign interference plunged Afghanistan into civil war, creating a power vacuum that facilitated the rise of the Taliban in 1996 (Maass, 2006).

The Taliban, an Islamist group, emerged in Afghanistan in 1994 under the spiritual leadership of Mullah Muhammad Omar. The majority of the Taliban were students from religious schools, or madrasas, hence the name "Taliban," which means "students" in Pashto. The movement began in the Madrasa Sang-i-Hisar in Maiwand, where Mullah Omar and a small group of students aimed to rid Afghanistan of warlords and criminals and establish Islamic Sharia. The original Taliban fighters were Pashtun Mujahideen who had resisted Soviet forces. Within months, the Taliban grew to 15,000 members and captured Spin Boldak in 1994. By February 1995, they controlled 12 provinces. The Taliban gained popularity due to their success in eliminating corruption, establishing law and order, and making the regions under their control safer. In 1996, they ousted President Rabbani and took control of Kabul, declaring Afghanistan an Islamic Emirate with Mullah Omar as *Amir-ul-Momineen* (Commander of the Faithful) (Najumi, 2008).

TNSM's Connections with the Taliban Government

The Taliban fighters were largely composed of graduates and students from Madrasas established in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the Soviet occupation, many of which were funded by Saudi Arabia. It is estimated that around 80,000 fighters from Pakistani Madrasas fought alongside the Taliban from 1996 until their fall in 2001 (Avis, 2016). The Madrasa of Sufi Muhammad, Darul-Uloom, located in Kumbhar, Maidan, also contributed many of its students to support the Afghan Taliban. These Afghan students, who had studied at Darul-Uloom, played a crucial role in establishing and maintaining contacts between Sufi Muhammad and the Taliban government, later accompanying him in the Jihad against US-led NATO forces (Ali I., 2009).

From its inception, the TNSM was an ardent supporter of the Afghan Taliban's rise to power. The TNSM was among the first groups to endorse the Taliban's victory and praised their efforts to implement Islamic Sharia. The Taliban's governance style served as an inspiration and model for TNSM, which sought to establish Sharia in Pakistan's Malakand Division. Encouraged by the Taliban's success, TNSM leaders believed that they too could achieve similar goals with sufficient public support (Ayaz, 2003).

TNSM not only admired but also formed direct links with the Taliban government. For example, Sufi Muhammad publicly justified and supported the Taliban's

destruction of the Buddha statues, a move that was praised by TNSM's delegation to Mullah Omar (Harding, 2001). In return, the Taliban provided moral and financial support to TNSM, encouraging them to continue their struggle. The endorsement from the Taliban, coupled with their financial assistance, significantly boosted TNSM's activities in Malakand Division, increasing their popularity and drawing more supporters to their cause (Ayaz, 2003).

9/11 and the US Invasion of Afghanistan

The Taliban government in Afghanistan enforced a strict interpretation of Deobandi and Wahhabi Islamic Sharia, intertwined with Pashtun social and cultural norms. Their policies, which included severe restrictions on women, iconoclastic actions, and public executions, drew widespread international condemnation. In addition to human rights abuses, the Taliban regime provided a haven for Al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. Consequently, only three countries—Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates—recognized the Taliban government between 1996 and 2001 (Organization, 2012).

On August 7, 1998, Al-Qaeda carried out attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, prompting the United States to launch missile strikes against Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and his network in Afghanistan. However, these strikes failed to eliminate bin Laden. Despite subsequent United Nations sanctions and demands to hand over bin Laden, the Taliban refused to comply (Larson, 2018).

After the September 11, 2001, attacks, the US held Al-Qaeda responsible and demanded that the Taliban surrender Osama bin Laden. The Taliban's refusal led to the US-led invasion of Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, under Operation Enduring Freedom. By December 2001, US-led NATO forces, with the assistance of the Northern Alliance, had ousted the Taliban regime (Gul, 2006).

Although the Taliban's version of Islamic governance did not evolve into a sustainable state, their rule had significant political implications beyond Afghanistan. The TNSM, which had long advocated for the imposition of Islamic Sharia in Pakistan, found both inspiration and material support from the Taliban government. During the Taliban's five-year rule, TNSM developed formal links with them (Najumi, 2008). After the US invasion, the Malakand Division in Pakistan, where TNSM was most active, was particularly affected, as thousands of TNSM fighters under Sufi Muhammad went to Afghanistan to support the Taliban, with many dying in battle (Amin, 2009).

The Role of TNSM in the Post-9/11 Afghan War

The TNSM had historically been an anti-democratic movement, characterized by its strong anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric. Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, TNSM shifted its focus from advocating for Sharia implementation to actively inciting local tribes to wage Jihad against the United States. The movement engaged in extensive fundraising efforts across the Malakand Division, successfully collecting significant amounts of cash and supplies to support the Taliban (Ahmad S., 2012).

TNSM also organized demonstrations, such as the large rally on October 10, 2001, in Timargara, where Sufi Muhammad denounced the U.S. as the world's greatest terrorist and framed the invasion as an attack on Islam and the Taliban's Islamic government in Afghanistan (Amin, 2009).

TNSM's Declaration of Jihad Against the USA

The TNSM leadership organized widespread protests and demonstrations throughout the Malakand Division to galvanize public sentiment in favor of Jihad against the United States. Through impassioned speeches, they urged tribesmen to join the Taliban in their struggle against the U.S. (Chawla N. K., 2019). In September 2001, TNSM arranged a major rally in Mingora (Swat) to mobilize a 'voluntary army' for Jihad. Sufi Muhammad, addressing the assembly, framed participation in this Jihad as a religious obligation, emphasizing that Muslims must support the Taliban against the perceived invaders (Fakhr-ul-Islam, 2017). He promised that TNSM members would independently provide the necessary resources, as the Taliban faced shortages (Burke, 2001). Sufi Muhammad also appealed to tribes such as Sultan Khel and Pinda Khel to join the Jihad, warning that non-participation would result in exclusion from Islam (Board, 2006).

As a result, thousands of tribesmen from Dir and other districts of Malakand Division prepared to engage in Jihad. Estimates of TNSM fighters ranged from 10,000 to 30,000. On October 27, 2001, a convoy led by Sufi Muhammad departed from Maidan, Dir, traveling through Bajaur Agency toward the Afghan border. The convoy, consisting of over 300 vehicles and armed with various weapons, camped in Laghary, a village near the border, with plans to cross into Afghanistan the following day (Rahmanullah, 2012).

Despite the Taliban's request for TNSM activists to await further instructions due to logistical constraints, TNSM leadership decided to proceed independently, citing their preparedness with necessary supplies and positioning themselves as a reserve force in Afghanistan (Toru, 2005).

Activities of TNSM Combatants in Afghanistan

On October 28, 2001, a convoy of 100 vehicles carrying TNSM combatants, led by Dr. Ismail, crossed into Afghanistan and was received by Taliban officials. They were directed to Asadabad, the capital of Kunar Province. The remaining combatants crossed the border in smaller groups, totaling over 10,000 individuals, with approximately 1,200 entering through Dir Upper (Dawn, 2001).

Upon arrival in Afghanistan, TNSM combatants received training in Asadabad and Jalalabad before being deployed across various fronts. Approximately 1,000 combatants were sent to Mazar-i-Sharif to fight alongside the Taliban against the Northern Alliance (NA). Additional TNSM fighters were stationed in southern Afghanistan, particularly in Kandahar, and some served as reinforcements in Kunduz. Despite their efforts, the combined forces of the Taliban and TNSM struggled against intense U.S. air strikes, leading to the fall of the Taliban regime on December 7, 2001 (Thomas, 2013).

Following the collapse of the Taliban government, the fighters, familiar with warfare but lacking local knowledge and sufficient ammunition, faced significant challenges. Many combatants attempted to surrender or were captured, with some being killed in air strikes or by NA forces. In Mazar-i-Sharif, where 1,000 TNSM combatants had been stationed, most perished in air strikes on a school building used as their shelter (Struck, 2001). Additionally, around 160 TNSM combatants were reported executed by U.S. forces in southern Afghanistan on November 28, 2001. The NA acknowledged killing over 600 TNSM fighters by November 16, 2001. Captured combatants were either held in private jails or handed over to their families in Pakistan for ransom. Some were transferred to U.S. custody and detained at Guantanamo Bay, while about 3,000 combatants remain unaccounted for, with no information on their status (ICRC, 2002).

The Arrest of Sufi Muhammad

Following the Taliban's heavy defeat, Sufi Muhammad, his son Ziaullah, and 28 of their close associates safely reached the Pakistani border area. They were arrested while entering Parachinar, Kurram Agency, after returning from fighting U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan in 2002 (Dawn, 2019). Security forces recovered explosive materials from their possession, including 42 Kalashnikovs, 39 hand grenades, 3 rocket launchers, and hundreds of rounds of ammunition (Ayaz, 2003). Subsequently, a specially constituted court convicted Sufi Muhammad and his associates, sentencing them to seven years of rigorous imprisonment for possessing illegal heavy weapons and crossing the border without the required documents. However, neither Maulana Sufi Muhammad nor any other individual was held accountable for the misdirection and deaths of thousands of people in Afghanistan (Dawn, July 12, 2019).

The Role of Sufi Muhammad in Military Operation in Malakand Division

In 2008, the KP government released Sufi Muhammad from prison to convince the Pakistani Taliban, particularly his son-in-law namely, Mullah Fazlullah of Swat to remain peaceful and to stop their illegal activities in parts of Malakand Division (Dawn, July 12, 2019). In February 2008, Sufi Muhammad on behalf of the militants of Swat brokered a peace deal with the government under which the militants had to cease their violent activities and the government would impose *Sharia* or Islamic law in Malakand Division (Bangash, 2009). Nonetheless, in April 2008, the militants violated the deal by challenging the writ of the government through unlawful activities not only in Swat but in the neighboring districts as well. This triggered the launch of a military operation *Rah-e-Haq* in Swat. During the operation, the worst kind of violence was witnessed in the area as police stations and army convoys were attacked, schools were destroyed, and civilians were abducted and killed by the Taliban. The chief of Taliban in Swat, Mullah Fazlullah, declared a ceasefire only when the provincial government agreed to implement *Nizam-i-Adl* regulation in Malakand Division on 15, February 2009 (Khattak D., 2012).

But this agreement also proved temporary and soon violence started again in the area.

This time the Taliban openly started their activities in other districts such as Dir, Buner, and Shangla. This caused the government to launch military operations against the militants in Swat, Dir, Buner, and Shangla. Mullah Fazlullah fled the area while the majority of his commanders were either detained or killed (Khattak D., 2012). Due to military operations against the militants in Malakand Division, some 2 million people fled their homes and took refuge in camps or with relatives in Mardan, Swabi, and Peshawar. Meanwhile, Sufi Muhammad delivered a controversial speech in Mingora, Swat, in which he declared the democratic system and Judiciary of Pakistan as un-Islamic. On July 30, 2009, Sufi Muhammad was arrested on charges of hate speech, rebellion, murder, treason, terrorism, and many other offenses (The Express Tribune, 2019). In prison, he had been suffering from kidney issues, diabetes, hypertension, and multiple other health problems. Keeping in view his deteriorating health, Sufi Muhammad was released from jail in January 2018. He passed away in Peshawar on July 11, 2019. His body was shifted and buried in his ancestral graveyard at Lal Qilla, Maidan, district Dir (Lower). The demise of Sufi Muhammad brought a formal end to the TNSM (Dawn, July 11, 2019).

Conclusion

The TNSM started as a regional movement in Pakistan, initially inspired by the Afghan jihad and aiming to enforce Sharia law in the Malakand Division. This paper has examined TNSM's development, including its initial attempts to impose Islamic law through peaceful means and its subsequent shift to radicalism.

The TNSM played an important role in the post-9/11 Afghan conflict by supporting the Taliban and participating in the fight against US-led forces. Its activities in the Malakand Division, such as fundraising and recruitment, significantly impacted the region. However, the movement's involvement in the Afghan conflict led to heavy losses, which reduced its support in Malakand. The death of its leader, Sufi Muhammad, in 2019 marked the end of TNSM as a major force.

In conclusion, this research highlights the factors that influenced the rise and fall of TNSM. It shows how ideological goals, regional conditions, and external events shaped the movement's path and led to its eventual decline. The study of TNSM offers important lessons on the dynamics of such organizations and their broader effects.

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